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The Fruits of Our Labor: Essays on 
Work and Its Impacts
Natalia Emanuel
These essays explore the modern workplace and how 
it impacts low-wage workers. The research focuses on the 
various ways low-wage work interacts with constraints 
and obligations inside and outside of work, including 
the effects of wage-setting decisions on productivity and 
retention among warehouse workers and customer service 
representatives, reasons underpinning the gender-pay gap 
among unionized bus and train operators, whether work 
obligations may be at fault for failure to appear at court 
dates, and why firms may be loath to offer remote work 
possibilities despite their effect on worker productivity. 
My work utilizes a number of different methods, including 
natural experiments, randomized controlled trials, and 
surveys. Each paper has leveraged data specific to the firm or 
organization I study.
Together, these essays aim to understand various different 
forces that are at play when firms are making key personnel 
decisions—such as how much to pay and the location of 
work—and when workers are optimizing, given the decisions 
that firms have made. 
Essay 1
The Payoffs of Higher Pay:  
Elasticities of Productivity and Labor  
Supply with Respect to Wages
 
(with Emma Harrington)
Firm wage-setting decisions must balance the benefits 
to the firm of higher pay—lower turnover, higher worker 
effort, and enhanced recruitment—against the direct costs of 
higher compensation. This essay provides new evidence on 
the returns to the firm of higher pay. We estimate elasticities 
of productivity, turnover, and recruitment among warehouse 
workers, and customer service employees at a Fortune 500 
retailer. We leverage idiosyncrasies in the firm’s pay-setting 
policies to estimate the response of productivity, turnover, 
and recruitment to pay using three complementary empirical 
strategies.
First, we use a large, abrupt jump in pay to look at the 
difference in turnover and productivity before and after. In 
one of the warehouses at the firm, the pay went from $16.20 
to $18.00/hour with no warning. The firm had long been 
concerned about this warehouse, but due to administrative 
issues in the compensation department, it had not followed 
through with adjusting pay. As such, the timing of the pay 
bump was as good as random. Moreover, no other changes 
in how the warehouse was run occurred at the same time, 
and accordingly we see no change in the demographic 
composition of the warehouse.
Moving in step with the pay increase at the warehouse, 
productivity jumps and turnover drops among the warehouse 
workers. Workers initially handled about 4.9 boxes per 
hour, but when their pay increased, they began handling 
another 0.33 boxes per hour. This would imply that a 1 
percent increase in pay is associated with about a 1 percent 
increase in productivity. The increase in this productivity 
is both because they are spending more of their time in the 
warehouse actually moving boxes, and also because they 
are moving boxes more swiftly. Likewise, turnover drops 
around the pay change. Beforehand, over 13 percent of the 
warehouse’s workers left each month. After the pay change, 
the turnover decreased by 2.5 percentage points. A 1 percent 
increase in pay in this warehouse was associated with a 3 
percent decrease in turnover.1
We then consider the same two responses to pay—
productivity and turnover—among another group of 
workers using a different empirical approach, finding 
similar results. Nationally, the firm has sticky wages for 
their customer service workers. Over time, the constant pay 
leads to exogenous variation in the value of wages relative 
to workers’ local outside options. By comparing changes in 
relative pay in various cities over the course of the year to 
the changes in the productivity and turnover in those cities, 
we are able to estimate the effect of changes in relative 
wages on workers’ behavior. The key assumptions are that 
the wages at our firm have negligible effects on the outside 
option. We are comfortable with this assumption because in 
any of the studied cities, this firm hires less than 0.5 percent 
of the people employed in customer service who work in 
that city. Additionally, we assume that other local changes 
that would affect productivity are orthogonal to changes 
in the wage. Our estimate would be biased toward zero if 
there were measurement error in wage growth, which would 
lead to attenuation bias if wage growth caused by a local 
productivity shock or inflows of more productive workers 
increased productivity in high wage-growth areas.
Using the sticky-pay empirical strategy, we find that 
when customer service workers receive pay that is $1 more 
than their outside option, their productivity increases and 
they are less likely to leave the firm, just as we had found 
with the warehouse workers. Customer service workers on 
average handled 25 calls per day but handled 1.9 calls, or 7.5 
percent more, when paid more. So, a 1 percent increase in 
pay is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in productivity. 
Interestingly, this does not come at the expense of customer 
satisfaction reviews: there does not appear to be a quantity-
quality trade-off. Rather, workers seem to spend less time 
on paperwork and a few more minutes per day working. 
Turnover among customer service workers decreases when 
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pay is higher than the outside option. Among customer 
service workers at this firm, 4.5 percent leave per month. But 
where pay is higher than the local outside option, there is a 
1.2 percentage point reduction in turnover. This implies that 
a 1 percent increase in pay is associated with a 4.5 percent 
reduction in turnover.
Recruitment also responds to pay. To estimate how, we 
use the fact that the firm sets wages nationally for its remote 
customer service workers. Regardless of location, the firm 
offers a wage of $14/hour, which creates heterogeneity in 
wages relative to the outside option. We estimate how the 
pay relative to workers’ outside options relates to the number 
of workers recruited, controlling for local controls, including 
the local unemployment rate and the number of people 
working on that occupation locally. The key assumption we 
make is that the covariance of the relative wage with features 
of the locality other than the pool of available workers and 
unemployment rate does not also correlate with differential 
recruitment. Since recruitment is done nationally and the 
firm is indifferent about the location of its remote customer 
service workers, we believe this to be a safe assumption. We 
find that for each dollar of pay, recruitment numbers increase 
by nearly 23 percent. Since we are measuring the number 
of people hired, we are capturing a measure of how many 
qualified candidates a dollar recruits, which is the relevant 
metric for a firm.
Finally, we estimate gender-specific responses to 
higher pay to understand what our model suggests about 
occupation-level gender pay gaps. Male customer service 
workers at our firm are almost 10 percent more likely to 
leave their jobs than are women. The gender difference in 
turnover is consistent with women facing smaller pools 
of outside options; for example, due to less willingness 
to commute. Moreover, men adjust their likelihood of 
leaving the job more in response to pay than do women: 
when paid a dollar more, men reduce their turnover by 40 
percent. The female labor supply response is not statistically 
significant. While we have no evidence about the source of 
this difference, it is consistent with men doing more on-the-
job-search than women. Assuming a constant production 
function and that there are no other gender differences, the 
difference in the labor supply responses would suggest that 
for every dollar a male worker earns, a female worker would 
earn $0.94.
In contrast, female customer service workers at our firm 
have larger productivity responses to pay. When paid a 
dollar more relative to the outside option, female customer 
service workers increase the number of calls handled by 
9 percent relative to the male increase of 5 percent. Given 
the firm’s cost per call, the female increase in productivity 
represents a savings of $1.91 per hour for a dollar increase 
in wages. For male workers, the firm just breaks even. 
That women increase their productivity more in the face 
of higher pay than do men suggests a force that pushes in 
the opposite direction of the existing gender pay gap. The 
different productivity response is consistent with a number of 
potential explanations, none of which we can identify from 
our administrative data,2 including women having more firm-
loyalty, believing that they have fewer outside options, and 
believing that they face discrimination.
As a whole, this essay aims to understand the incentives 
firms face when setting pay in regard to productivity, 
recruitment, and turnover. However, the essay leaves many 
unanswered questions about the gender pay gap. Sources of 
the within-occupation gender pay gap are addressed in the 
next paper in my dissertation.
Essay 2
Why Do Women Earn Less Than Men? 
Evidence from Bus and Train Operators
 
(with Val Bolotnyy)
At the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA), 
the unionized organization that runs Boston-area buses and 
trains, there exists a gender pay gap: for each dollar that 
the typical male employee takes home, the typical female 
employee earns $0.89.
The existence of a gender pay gap in this workplace 
is curious since many of the traditional explanations for 
the gender pay gap are moot in this context. The union-
negotiated contract specifies pay rates and tenure-based 
promotion schedules with the explicit intent of eliminating 
any managerial bias in these domains. The structures of 
the contract also mean that any gender-based differences 
in workers’ willingness to compete or negotiate are 
rendered irrelevant in this workplace. Finally, since we 
are looking only at one occupation, we are not picking up 
on occupational sorting, one prominent explanation for 
economy-wide gender pay gaps.
In this essay we explore the roots of the gender pay gap 
among unionized bus and train operators. We leverage the 
fact that seniority is the sole determinant of workplace 
opportunities such as overtime at the MBTA to understand 
the operators’ value of time and other amenities. Conditional 
on seniority, male and female operators face the same choice 
sets of schedules, routes, vacation days, and overtime hours, 
among other amenities. Nevertheless, the earnings gap 
persists even when we condition on seniority.
Mechanically, the gender pay gap can be explained by the 
fact that male operators take on 1.5 more overtime hours (83 
percent) per week and take off 1.3 fewer unpaid hours off 
work (49 percent) per week than their female counterparts. 
This is indicative that female operators value their time 
outside of work more than do male operators, consistent with 
women handling more household and child care duties than 
men.
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The difference in male and female overtime is driven 
by overtime opportunities that arrive on short notice and 
therefore demand that operators are flexible about when they 
work. When overtime is scheduled the day before or the day 
of the necessary shift, male operators work almost twice as 
many of those hours as female operators. In contrast, when 
overtime hours are scheduled three months in advance, 
male operators sign up for only 7 percent more of them than 
female operators.
Exacerbating the disparity in overtime acceptance rates, 
male operators strategically substitute regular hours for 
higher-paying overtime hours using the Family Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), a federal statute that allows workers 
with a doctor’s note to take unpaid time off of work to attend 
to their own medical needs or those of a family member. At 
the MBTA, FMLA has been nicknamed the “Friday-Monday 
Leave Act” for the way that operators have used it to avoid 
undesirable shifts. Both male and female operators take 
more FMLA hours when faced with undesirable shifts (e.g., 
a weekend or holiday shift). However, male operators also 
work enough overtime hours in weeks with an undesirable 
shift that they effectively trade off hours paid at the regular 
wage for overtime hours paid at 1.5 times their wage. Female 
operators also work more overtime hours in weeks with 
undesirable shifts and therefore more unpaid time off, but 
do not completely make up the pay lost to FMLA leave. 
Together, the last-minute overtime and the usage of FMLA 
mechanically account for the pay gap.
We explore how family arrangements relate to the 
differences in propensity to accept overtime. The gap 
between the acceptance of overtime opportunities of 
male and female operators is larger if the operators have 
dependents (6.8 percentage points) than if they do not (5.7 
percentage points). Male acceptance rates, meanwhile, are 
similar for the two groups (38.2 percent for male opera- tors 
with dependents, 41.1 percent for male operators without 
dependents). Though dependents generate this wedge in 
acceptance rates among married and unmarried operators, the 
wedge is largest among married operators. Married men with 
dependents accept overtime opportunities 27.1 percent of 
the time, while married women with dependents accept them 
19.6 percent of the time. For unmarried men with dependents 
the acceptance rate is 40.3 percent, compared to 33.6 percent 
for unmarried women with dependents. These results are 
consistent with male operators doing more child care through 
their pocketbooks, and with female operators doing more 
child care through time spent outside of work. Differences in 
caretaking approaches and responsibilities thus appear to be 
a significant reason why female operators work less overtime 
than male operators.
We next seek to understand more about male and 
female scheduling preferences, focusing on scheduling 
conventionality and controllability. While both male and 
female operators avoid unconventional shifts, female 
operators do so more. The most senior operators, who 
pick their schedules first, have much lower incidence of 
unconventional shifts—weekend shifts, shifts on holidays, 
and shifts split into two blocks (“split shifts”)—relative to 
operators who choose their schedules later. While 95 percent 
of the least senior operators get stuck with a weekend shift 
on their schedules, only 28 percent (female operators) to 35 
percent (male operators) of the most senior operators do. The 
same pattern holds true for holiday shifts and split shifts. 
While all operators avoid unconventional schedules, female 
operators avoid them more readily. Female operators are on 
average about 2.5 percentage points less likely to select a 
weekend shift than are male operators.
Female operators value time outside of work and schedule 
controllability more than do male operators, especially when 
they have dependents. Female operators with dependents are 
considerably less likely than male operators with dependents 
to accept an overtime opportunity. When it comes to 
overtime hours worked, unmarried female operators with 
dependents work only 6 percent fewer of them when they 
are preplanned three months in advance, but about 60 
percent fewer of them when they are offered on short notice. 
Unmarried women with dependents also take the largest 
amount of unpaid time off with FMLA, making them the 
lowest earners in our setting.
Lastly, we study the impact of two policy changes at 
the MBTA, each of which made it harder for operators to 
swap regular hours for overtime hours. The first policy 
change made it more difficult for operators to obtain FMLA 
certification, to use FMLA for anything other than a medical 
issue, and to take unpaid time off at a moment’s notice. The 
second policy change, a year later, redefined overtime hours 
from any hours worked in excess of 8 in a given day to any 
hours worked in excess of 40 in a given week.
These policies simultaneously reduced the gender 
earnings gap and hurt workers. The gender earnings 
gap shrank from 12 percent before the FMLA policy 
change to 9 percent between the first and second policies’ 
implementation and to 6 percent following the second 
policy’s arrival. Yet, in addition to reducing the gap, these 
policies also reduced schedule controllability. Those who 
took more unpaid time off via FMLA before the policy 
changes now took more unexcused leave instead, indicating 
that these operators still desired control over their schedules. 
Operators began procuring this control at a higher cost, since 
unexcused leave can result in suspensions and discharge 
from work (unlike FMLA leave). Because female workers 
have greater revealed preference for schedule controllability, 
these policies—particularly the first—affected female 
operators more negatively than they did male operators.
Our results suggest two potentially Pareto-improving 
strategies that could be implemented in this and similar 
settings. First, if operators are allowed to exchange or 
transfer shifts, unexpected absenteeism could be reduced. 
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Reducing absenteeism would decrease both unpaid time off 
and resultant last-minute overtime opportunities, both of 
which fuel the earnings gap. Service provision would also 
improve if absenteeism drops and operator productivity 
consequently increases. Second, expanding the number 
of operators whose job is specifically to cover for others’ 
absences would also likely decrease the earnings disparity, 
overtime expenses, and inconsistent service.
This paper uses the unique setting of unionized bus 
and train operators to explore how seemingly neutral firm 
policies can result in unequal outcomes. While the essay 
focuses on this singular occupation, the lessons learned are 
broadly applicable. Many occupations have last-minute 
scheduling—whether it is the server at JambaJuice, which 
assigns shifts based on the upcoming weather, or the lawyer 
who is asked to do a dinner tomorrow night with a client. In 
these occupations, employees who have obligations outside 
the workforce may have to forego valuable opportunities in 
the same way as bus and train operators. Similarly, many 
occupations have relatively little flexibility, prompting 
workers to try to inject flexibility into their schedules in ways 
that can be quite costly to them. Since many of the features 
that prompt the pay gap among bus and train operators show 
up in other occupations as well, this paper highlights specific 
sources of the gender pay gap that may be generalizable 
outside this particular setting.
Essay 3
Behavioral Biases and Legal Compliance
 
(with Helen Ho)
When considering attendance at court hearings, traffic, 
municipal, and misdemeanor courts have a problem: as many 
as 40 percent of defendants fail to appear (FTA). FTAs are 
costly for the court since it leads to unused personnel time. 
Statutorily, they are also costly to defendants: they can result 
in warrants for the defendant’s arrest, fines, and fees.
Court officials as well as defendants who did show up 
believed that work makes attending a court date particularly 
challenging. Work obligations can make spending four 
hours in court plus travel time quite costly. Nevertheless, 
if the hearing occurs while the defendant is not working, 
the inability to bring children into the courtroom may be 
a challenge. If they are charged with a large fine or fee, 
liquidity constraints may make attendance unattractive. 
To address these time and resource constraints, courts 
offer some accommodations, including rescheduling and 
payment plan options. However, accessing these court 
accommodations is notoriously difficult to people who 
don’t know, for example, that they must file a request for 
a “one-time continuance” if they seek to reschedule. It is 
also possible, however, that defendants are forgetful or 
disorganized and simply need the arraignment brought to 
their attention.
To understand the potential causes of an FTA and 
examine low-cost, scalable ways to address the problem, we 
collaborated with a large court system to run a randomized 
controlled trial (RCT). In this trial, we provided defendants 
with no additional information (the treatment arm), 
with informational nudge reminders that helped remind 
defendants about the arraignment and possible court 
accommodations, or with informational nudges alongside the 
offer of personalized assistance.
If constraints such as work and child care obligations 
prevent attendance at court, we would expect that the 
defendants randomized to receive either informational 
nudges or personalized assistance would have greater 
uptake of court accommodations and greater attendance at 
their arraignments as well. If difficulty navigating the court 
system were part of the cause, then we would expect to see 
additional boosts in usage of court accommodations and 
reductions in FTA rates.
In our RCT, we found that personalized assistance 
increased uptake of court accommodations such as 
rescheduling and payment plans. However, both 
informational nudges and personalized assistance were 
equally effective in reducing FTA rates, taking them from a 
baseline of 21 percent FTA down by 39 percent. Moreover, 
there was no difference between the two arms in terms of the 
amount paid out by the defendants.
Essay 4
“Working” Remotely? Selection, Treatment,  
and the Market for Remote Work
(with Emma Harrington)
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, only 6 percent of 
U.S. jobs were remote. This is curious be- cause many 
jobs are “remoteable,” many workers report wanting to 
work remotely, and prior studies suggest there is a positive 
treatment effect of working remotely. During the COVID-
19 pandemic, as many as 45 percent of workers reported 
they would like to remain remote even after the pandemic. 
Mas and Pallais (2017) found that call-center workers 
were willing to accept 8 percent lower wages in order to be 
remote. Moreover, Bloom et al. (2015) found remote work 
actually increased productivity. Nevertheless, even at what 
appears to be the tail end of the pandemic, only 9 percent of 
job postings are for fully remote positions.
The puzzle thus arises: Why is there so little remote work 
despite the fact that such a work setup seems to enhance 
worker happiness and productivity? In this essay, the final 
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paper completed during my PhD,3 we argue that adverse 
selection is at fault. Worse workers are inclined to accept 
remote jobs, thereby raising the cost of remote positions 
to the firm. To map the dynamics around remote work, we 
leverage data from customer service representatives at a 
Fortune 500 retail firm.
We develop a model that ties promotion penalties to the 
selection of workers who choose remote jobs. In the model, 
remote work reduces the probability that firms learn about 
workers’ abilities. Latently low-ability workers consequently 
sort into remote jobs to hide their ability while latently 
high-ability workers sort into on-site jobs to reveal their 
high ability. The resulting adverse selection into remote 
work raises its average cost above its marginal cost, causing 
remote work to be underprovided.
This model fits several indicators of informational 
frictions present in the firm. Managers appear to be less 
certain about remote workers’ productivity: managers’ 
evaluations are less predictive of the future performance of 
remote workers than on-site workers. Accordingly, workers 
at the retailer who chose remote jobs had about half of the 
promotion chances as those who chose on-site jobs. This 
is consistent with Bloom et al.’s (2015) finding that remote 
work negatively impacts promotion.
We test the model’s predictions empirically, analyzing 
productivity differences between workers who are hired into 
comparable remote and on-site jobs. We use the number of 
calls the call-center worker handles as the primary metric of 
productivity, but check also that there is no quantity-quality 
trade-off by measuring customer satisfaction ratings. Two 
natural experiments at the retailer allow us to separately 
identify the treatment and selection effects of remote work.
First, the retailer introduced a program in 2018 that 
allowed on-site workers to apply to remote call-center jobs. 
The initiative changed new hires’ offers. Considering the 
group of people who ultimately ended up working remotely, 
we compare the productivity of those who thought that 
they would likely always work on-site to those who were 
offered a job where they knew they would go remote. This 
comparison captures the selection effect of offering remote 
work. To estimate the treatment effect of remote work, we 
can look at the productivity of those workers who started 
on-site and also worked remotely. For workers who thought 
that they would always work on-site and were surprised by 
the opportunity to go remote, this comparison represents 
only the treatment effect.
Second, COVID-19 caused all of the call-center workers 
to work remotely. Starting on April 6, 2020, all on-site call-
center workers were sent to work from home. Comparing 
these workers’ productivity captures both the treatment 
effect of remote work as well as the effects of COVID-19. 
However, since July 2018 the retailer has hired workers 
directly into remote call-center jobs, creating a control 
group. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we can 
cancel out the common shocks of COVID-19 on worker 
productivity. Moreover, by comparing the prepandemic 
productivity of those who were initially on-site to those 
who were initially remote, we capture the selection effect of 
remote work.
These two natural experiments give relatively similar 
estimates of the treatment and selection effects of remote 
work. In the first, we estimate that being offered remote work 
reduces productivity by 21 percent. The selection effect as 
measured in the second natural experiment estimates an 18 
percent reduction in productivity. In neither setting does the 
decreased number of calls handled mean that the remote 
call-center workers are compensating by achieving higher 
customer satisfaction. The treatment effect estimated in 
the first natural experiment marks a 7 percent increase in 
productivity on account of remote work. The increase in calls 
handled arises from them answering queries 3 percent faster 
and spending 4.5 percent more time on the phone rather than 
waiting, filing paperwork, and performing other adjacent 
tasks. The treatment effect as measured in the second natural 
experiment represents a 10 percent increase in productivity. 
Again, these increases in the calls handled do not come at the 
expense of customer satisfaction. Together, the two natural 
experiments provide evidence of a positive treatment effect, 
but a negative selection effect of remote work.
Finally, we quantify the distortion arising from the 
adverse selection that we document. We estimate workers’ 
demand for remote work using the retailer’s policy of 
paying all remote workers the same wage nationally. By 
paying all workers $14/hour, regardless of location, the 
firm creates variation in the opportunity cost of taking the 
remote job because workers’ local on-site alternative jobs 
vary in their wages. Using the estimated demand curve, 
we find that adverse selection likely reduces the share of 
call-center workers working remotely from 17 percent to 6 
percent nationally, leading to losses of $824 million annually 
just among the 3.2 million American call-center workers. 
Relative to other occupations, call-center jobs tend not to 
have tremendous promotion ladders; at our retailer, there are 
only two major promotion levels. Call-center work is also 
relatively easy to monitor from afar. As such, the losses may 
be even more substantial in other occupations where career 
concerns are more acute and where it is more challenging to 
monitor workers’ productivity if they are not on-site.
Our analysis suggests that the pandemic will attenuate 
but not eliminate adverse selection into remote work. On the 
worker side, surveys suggest that the retailer’s workers have 
learned more about their tastes during the lockdown, causing 
more high-ability workers to choose remote jobs. This 
reduction in the average cost of remote work would increase 
its prevalence by 1.1 percentage point. On the firm side, we 
find little evidence that the retailer’s experience with remote 
work reduced the promotion penalty and the consequent 
incentive for workers to sort on ability.
2021 Dissertation Summaries  25
Having leveraged data from call-center workers, a 
highly “remoteable” job, our paper unfortunately cannot 
speak to tasks that require much coordination or intense 
concentration. For jobs requiring such tasks, prior studies 
have found less benefit of remote work. As such, provision 
of remote work for these jobs could arise from both the 
treatment and selection effects.
Conclusion
Together, the essays completed in my doctoral studies 
address several issues of work for low-wage workers, 
including how firms set wages, the various forces 
undergirding the gender pay gap, how work obligations may 
impact legal obligations like attending a court arraignment, 
and why remote work appears to be underprovisioned in the 
marketplace. The essays use a range of tools—from natural 
experiments to surveys and RCTs—to address the pressing 
issues for low-wage workers at the moment.
Notes
 1. I have noted the results of an analysis looking at an interrupted 
time series. But the results are robust to considering a 
difference-in-differences approach, using the firm’s other 
warehouses as the control group.
 2. The partner firm was unwilling to let us run a survey on this 
topic.
 3. This paper was completed during my PhD, under the 
advisement of my dissertation committee. It was not included 
in the dissertation submitted to Harvard because I delivered my 
baby prematurely and did not have time to format it according 
to the university’s specifications before the submission 
deadline.
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